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Abstract
Studying continuous time counterpart of some discrete time dynamics is now a
standard and fruitful technique, as some properties hold in both setups. In game
theory, this is usually done by considering differential games on Euclidean spaces.
This allows to infer properties on the convergence of values of a repeated game, to
deal with the various concepts of approachability, etc. In this paper, we introduce
a specific but quite abstract differential game defined on the Wasserstein space of
probability distributions and we prove the existence of its value. Going back to
the discrete time dynamics, we derive results on weak approachability with partial
monitoring: we prove that any set satisfying a suitable compatibility condition is
either weakly approachable or weakly excludable. We also obtain that the value
for differential games with nonanticipative strategies is the same that those defined
with a new concept of strategies very suitable to make links with repeated games.
1 Introduction
Blackwell’s approachability [7] is a core concept in repeated games [4, 41, 1]. It is defined
in two-player repeated games where the stage outcome is a vector in Rd, possibly repre-
senting d different criteria to optimize simultaneously. Both players aim at controlling
the time average outcome. The objective of player 1 is that the time average vecto-
rial payoff converges to some fixed target set E ⊂ Rd. If he can ensure that objective,
then the target set is called approachable. The objective of player 2 is to prevent this
convergence.
The motivation behind approachability theory is twofold as it can be applied both
in game theory and in machine learning (more specially in online learning). Indeed, it
is a standard tool in game theory, as it can be used to construct optimal strategies in
repeated games with incomplete information [4] or to construct equilibria in multi-player
repeated game [41]. In machine learning, it offers a clean and elegant solution to online
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multi-criteria optimization problems. More precisely, one of the most important class of
problems called regret minimization [8, 1], as well as other online learning criteria such
as calibration [15, 20, 32, 33, 27] are special cases of approachability. We refer to [13, 32]
for surveys and textbooks on online learning and connections between approachability
and other concepts.
1.1 Weak approachability in Euclidean space, with full monitoring
We assume that the action sets of player 1 and 2 are convex and compact subset of
R
a and Rb denoted respectively by X ⊂ Ra and Y ⊂ Rb. The outcome is defined
trough a bi-linear mapping g(x, y) = xAy :=
∑
i,j x[i]y[j]Ai,j ∈ Rd where Ai,j ∈ Rd and
x = (x[i])i∈{1,...,a}, y = (y[j])j∈{1,...,b}. We denote by G = {g(x, y), x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } the
range of g and by gm := g(xm, ym) the outcome at stage m ∈ N generated by the choices
of xm ∈ X and ym ∈ Y .
We assume that the length of the game is finite, known and equal to n ∈ N. A
strategy of player 1 is then a mapping from
⋃n−1
k=0 (X × Y )k into X (and into Y for
player 2).
In this vectorial framework, objectives are represented by some exogenous closed set
E ⊂ Rd. Player 1 aims at making the average outcome gn := 1n
∑n
m=1 gm converge to
E and player 2 aims at preventing it. Stated otherwise, player 1 aims at minimizing the
distance d(gn, E) of gn to E, where d(z,E) = infω∈E ‖z − ω‖; conversely, player 2 aims
at maximizing this distance.
Definition 1 A closed set E ⊂ Rd is weakly approachable by the first player if for every
ε > 0, there exists N ∈ N, such that for every n ≥ N , there exists a strategy of the first
player σn such that, no matter the strategy τ of the second player, d(gn, E) ≤ ε.
A closed set E ⊂ Rd is weakly excludable if player 2 can weakly approach the comple-
ment of some η-neighborhood of E (with η > 0 small enough).
Vieille [42] proved the following conjecture of Blackwell [7]
Proposition 2 Every closed set E ⊂ Rd is either weakly approachable or weakly exclud-
able.
Informally speaking, this result says that the value1 of the zero-sum game with payoff
d(gn, E) converges as the horizon n ∈ N increases, see, e.g., [32]. The main insight behind
the proof of Vieille [42] consists in seeing the n-stage game, for n large enough, as a close
approximation of a specific zero-sum differential game. As a consequence, the values of
the repeated games converge to the value of the differential game. Recently, connections
between differential games and repeated games have been fruitfully exhibited [12, 2, 32].
1Because of the lack of convexity of the payoff mapping, the value is only guaranteed to exist in the
equivalent framework where players can choose actions at random.
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1.2 A Basic introduction of differential games
Differential games were introduced in [21, 36]. Here we consider two-player zero-sum
differential games which dynamics are
g′(s) = f(s, g(s), x(s), y(s)), s ∈ [0, 1] (1)
and which payoff has the form
J := ℓ(g(1)).
The state variable is g ∈ Rd. The players acts on the system by choosing measurable
controls : Player 1 wants to minimize the payoff J by choosing the control x : [0, 1] 7→ X
while Player 2 tries to maximize J by choosing the control y : [0, 1] 7→ Y (X and
Y are given compact subsets of some finite dimensionnal space). The functions f :
[0, 1] × Rd ×X × Y 7→ Rd and ℓ : Rd 7→ R are supposed to be Lipschitz continuous and
bounded.
In view of his objective (minimization or maximization) of the payoff, each player
chooses his control knowing the past actions of his opponents. This is precisely expressed
by the notion of strategies we explain now.
Let us denote by X the set of measurable controls x : [0, 1] 7→ X of player 1. Similarly
Y(s0) denotes the set of player 2 controls. A nonanticipative strategy for player 1 is a
map α : Y 7→ X which associates to any a control y chosen by player 2 a control x of
player 1 in a nonanticipative way i.e : For any t ∈ [0, 1] if two controls y1 and y2 coincide
almost everywhere on [0, t] then α(y1) and α(y2) also coincide almost everywhere on
[0, t]. An nonanticipative strategy β : X 7→ Y for player 2 is similarly defined.
For (s0, g0) ∈ [0, 1] × Rd , we denote by gs0,g0,x,y(·) the unique solution of (1) with
the initial condition g(s0) = g0. We define then the following value functions which are
the results of the optimal actions of the players
V +(s0, g0) := inf
α
sup
y∈Y
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,α(y),y(1)
)
V −(s0, g0) := sup
β
inf
x∈X
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,x,β(x)(1)
)
.
An important problem concerns the existence of a value of the game namely the validity
of the equality V + = V −. This result has been for instance obtained in [17] by proving
that V + and V − are Lipschitz continuous and they are both viscosity solution of a
partial differential equation (called the Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equation) which has the
uniqueness property. This result is valid under suitable Isaacs’ condition (cf (12) later
on). For more general existence of value results we refer the reader to [6, 10, 35] (see
also [9]).
It could be surprising at the first glance that the above values V + and V − are not
defined in a symmetric way. One can show that the game can be written into a a normal
form when the cost J is regular enough with a little different notion of strategies (cf
Definition 4). Section 4 is devoted to some basic facts for differential games and also
contains a new result concerning a new class of strategies.
3
1.3 From partial monitoring in Euclidean space to full monitoring in
Wasserstein space
A crucial and implicit assumption in the model of Section 1.1 is the fact that players
observe at each stage the action chosen by their opponent. This framework is usually
called “with full monitoring”.
As it is now standard in game theory [4, 23, 29, 30] and machine learning [37, 25, 26,
31, 24] we may assume that player 1 does not necessarily observe the action of player 2
but only receives signals about it. This framework is called “with partial monitoring”.
Formally, if actions taken at stage m are xm ∈ X and ym ∈ Y then the (unknown) stage
outcome is gm = xmAym and the signal observed is µm := Sym ∈ Rk where S is a 1× b
matrix with components in Rk.
A strategy of player 1 is then a mapping from
⋃n−1
m=0 (X × S)m into X, where S is the
range of S. On the other hand, we can assume that player 2 has still a full monitoring
on player 1’s actions, and his strategies are mappings from
⋃n−1
m=0 (X × Y × S)m into
Y . As with full monitoring, a closed set E ⊂ Rd is weakly approachable if player 1 can
ensure that the average payoff is ε-close to E, if the length of the game is big enough,
see Definition 1.
Perchet and Quincampoix [34] have developed an abstract setup to treat any game
with partial monitoring as a game with full monitoring and outcomes in the Wasserstein
space of probability distribution on X×S. Outcomes are therefore probability measures
to be interpreted as the maximal information available to player 1.
The basic idea relies on the following multi-valued mapping p defined on X × S.
p(x, µ) =
{
xAy ; y ∈ Y such that Sy = µ
}
.
The sequence (y1, . . . , yn) of actions of player 2 generates a sequence of signals (µ1, . . . , µn).
So the only information available to the player is that gm, the outcome at stage m, be-
longs to pm = p(xm, µm). As a consequence, to ensure that gn belongs to some set E,
the Minkowski average set
pn =
1
n
n∑
m=1
pm :=
{ 1
n
n∑
m=1
gm ; gm ∈ pm
}
must be included in E. Moreover, this inclusion has the following interesting interpre-
tation:
pn ⊂ E ⇔ 1n
∑n
m=1 p(xm, µm) ⊂ E ⇔ 1n
∑n
m=1 Eδxm⊗δµm [p] ⊂ E ⇔ E(x⊗µ)n [p] ⊂ E
⇔ (x⊗ µ)n ∈ E˜ :=
{
q ∈ ∆(X × S) s.t Eq[p] ∈ E
}
,
where ⊗ stands for the tensor product, δx is the Dirac mass on x and we introduce
the notation (x ⊗ µ)m = δxm ⊗ δµm . The set E˜ ⊂ ∆(X × S) we introduced somehow
corresponds to the set of “compatible informations” with the objectives of players 1, i.e.,
4
those that guarantee the average payoff belongs to the target set E. Stated otherwise,
the problem of weak-approachability with partial monitoring of a closed set E ⊂ Rd
can be rewritten as a problem of weak-approachability of the set E˜ ⊂ ∆(X × S) in the
Wasserstein space . This reduction has the following interesting upside: instead of trying
to control average of sets in Euclidean space, a player can aim at controlling averages of
points, even if they belong to some lifted, more complex space. Indeed, averages of sets
are difficult objects to handle; for instance, even intuitively, it is not clear how to make
them “converge” to a target set. On the contrary, it is rather intuitive for averages of
points (even in a lifted space): one just need to find the next point in the “direction” of
the target set. Here, the difficulty is to define properly the concept of direction, yet once
this is done, controls are easier to construct.
As a consequence, we aim at generalizing the traditional techniques in Euclidean
space by introducing some zero-sum differential games in Wasserstein space. Then we
will first obtain conditions ensuring the existence of a value and then show that the
n-stage repeated games are close to some limit differential game. This will enable us
to prove that any closed set E˜ ⊂ ∆(X × S) is either weakly-approachable or weakly-
excludable.
Notice that this does not imply that any set E ⊂ Rd is either weakly approachable
or weakly excludable (which is an incorrect statement, see Perchet [30]), but it implies
that any set of the form
{Eq[p], q ∈ E˜} ⊂ Rd
is either weakly-approachable or weakly-excludable with partial monitoring.
1.4 Weak approachability in Wasserstein Space
We now define formally what we meant in the last section by weak approachability in
the Wasserstein space. Let X ⊂ Ra and Z ⊂ Rb be two convex compacts sets of some
Euclidian spaces and E˜ ⊂ ∆(X×Z) be a closed subset of∆(X×Z), the set of probability
distributions over X × Z. This set is equipped with the Wasserstein quadratic distance
W2, which definition is recalled in the preliminaries section 3.1.
The game in discrete time is described as follows. At stage m ∈ N, players choose
respectively xm ∈ ∆(X) and zm ∈ ∆(Z) and these choices induce the stage outcome
θm = xm⊗zm ∈ ∆(X×Z). This outcome θm is observed by both players, i.e., the game
is with full monitoring, before stage m+ 1 begins.
Definition 3 A closed set E˜ ⊂ ∆(X×Z) is weakly approachable by player 1 if for every
ε > 0, there exists N ∈ N, such that for every n ≥ N , he has a strategy σn such that, no
matter the strategy τ of player 2,
W2(θn, E˜) := inf
q∈E˜
W2(θn, q) ≤ ε.
A closed set E˜ ⊂ ∆(X×Z) is weakly excludable by player 2 if he can weakly approach
the complement of some η-neighborhood of E˜, with η > 0.
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1.5 Organization of the paper and main results
The remaining of the paper is divided in two main parts. Section 2.1 is devoted to the
study of differential and repeated games in Euclidean space to get some intuitions, and
we start working in the Wasserstein space of probability measures in Section 3, after a
preliminary section on Wasserstein distance.
In Section 2.1, we basically recover the main result of Vieille but with an alternative
proof and with new concepts of strategies that we purposely introduced. One might
wonder why we bother proving again such an elegant result with a longer and maybe
more intricate proof. The first reason is that the Euclidean framework is obviously more
natural and more intuitive than the Wasserstein space of probability measures. But
more importantly, all the proofs we give in the former setup can be generalized at no
cost to the later. Unfortunately, it was not the case of the techniques of Vieille [42],
based notably on results of Flemming [18, 19] or some of the ideas appearing in some
other differential games with dynamics in Wasserstein space [11, 22, 28].
For the sake of clarity, we therefore chose to decompose the main arguments into
those that hold no matter the ambiant space (i.e., either in Euclidean or Wasserstein
spaces, the proof being stated in the former as it is more intuitive) and those that are
true in the Wasserstein space; they are described in Section 3.
2 Weak approachability with full monitoring through a dif-
ferential game
2.1 A Differential Game with Non Anticipative strategies with delay
As it becomes more and more popular in repeated game theory, we represent the n-stage
repeated game as a discretization (or an approximation) of some differential game.
Given the fixed horizon n ∈ N and m ≤ n, the following equation describes the
evolution of average payoffs in discrete time.
gnm+1 = g
n
m +
1
m+ 1
(xnm+1Ay
n
m+1 − gnm).
The continuous analogue of the above discrete equation is the following differential equa-
tion:
g˙(s) =
1
s
(
x(s)Ay(s) − g(s)
)
, ∀s ∈ [s0, 1] and g(s0) = g0 ∈ G ⊂ Rd (2)
for some s0 > 0. Its solution is given by the following integral equation
g(s) =
s0
s
g0 +
1
s
∫ s
s0
x(t)Ay(t)dt. (3)
A control x of the player 1 is a measurable map from [s0, 1] to X; the set of such
controls is denoted by X (s0) (and, similarly, Y(s0) for player 2). For any s0 ∈ (0, 1],
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g0 ∈ Rd and (x,y) ∈ X (s0) × Y(s0) we denote by s 7→ gs0,g0,x,y(s) the unique solution
to (3).
Let us recall the notion of Nonanticipative Strategies with Delays (in short: NAD
Strategies).
Definition 4 Given s0 ∈ R, a NAD for player 1 is a map α : Y(s0) 7→ X (s0) such
that there exists a subdivision t0 := s0 < t1 < . . . tN := 1 of the interval [s0, 1] such
that for any k = 0, 1 . . . N − 1 if y1(·) and y2(·) coincide almost surely on [s0, tk] then
the controls α(y1)(·) and α(y2)(·) coincide almost surely on [s0, tk+1]. The set of such
nonanticipative strategies α for player 1 is denoted by A(s0). We define in a similar way
the set B(s0) of nonanticipative strategies β for player 2.
One interest of such strategies lies on the fact that one can associate a trajectory to
a pair of strategies due to the following result, cf, e.g., [11].
Lemma 5 For any pair (α, β) ∈ A(s0) × B(s0) there exists a unique pair of control
(x,y) ∈ X (s0)× Y(s0) such that
α(x) = y and β(x) = y.
So for (α, β) ∈ A(s0) × B(s0) we define gs0,g0,α,β = gs0,g0,x,y where (x,y) is associated
with (α, β) by Lemma 5.
Coming back to the dynamics (2) and considering the specific loss ℓ : Rd → R+
defined by ℓ(z) := d(z,E), the distance to the closed set E, we now define the value
functions of the game.
The upper-value of the differential game is given by
V +(s0, g0) := inf
α∈A(s0)
sup
β∈B(s0)
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,α,β(1)
)
.
while the the lower-value is
V −(s0, g0) := sup
β∈B(s0)
inf
α∈A(s0)
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,α,β(1)
)
.
for every s0 ∈ (0, 1] and g0 ∈ Rd.
Observe also that Lemma 5 yields
V +(s0, g0) = inf
α∈A(s0)
sup
y
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,α(y),y(1)
)
and V −(s0, g0) = sup
β∈B(s0)
inf
x
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,x,β(x)(1)
)
which is the same definition of values that those given in subsection 1.2. Some classical
results on such differential games are recalled in the Appendix.
Because of the dynamics we consider, the game has a value in NAD strategies :
∀ s0 > 0,∀g0 ∈ Rd, V −(s0, g0) = V +(s0, g0).
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Moreover the common value -denoted by V - is the unique Lipschitz continuous viscosity
solution of {
∂V
∂s (s, g) +H
(
s, g, ∂V∂g (s, g)
)
= 0 for all (s, g) ∈ [s0, 1]× Rd
V (1, g) = ℓ(g) for all g ∈ Rd
(4)
where
H(s, g, p) := sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
p.
1
s
{
xAy − g
}
= inf
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
p.
1
s
{
xAy − g
}
In view of a deeper analysis between the above discrete game and the differential
game introduced, we are led to introduce a smaller class of strategies in the following
Section. We mention here that the results of the following Section 2.2, stated for this
new class of strategies, also hold for the classical NAD strategies. Yet this new concept
of strategy is, first, conceptually simpler and, second, can be directly connected to a
strategy in a repeated game (see Section 2.3).
2.2 A new concept of strategies adapted to the discrete-continuous
time approximation
In this section, we develop the new concept of strategies, more adapted to the discrete-
continuous time approximation than the existing ones [18, 19].
Definition 6 A non-anticipative with delay piecewise-constant strategy of player 1 is a
mapping α from Y(s0) to X (s0) satisfying the following properties:
1) There exists some integer N ∈ N such that, for any control y ∈ Y(s0), α(y) is
constant on [m/N, (m+ 1)/N ], for all m ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}
2) The strategy is non-anticipative with delay: if y(s) = y′(s) for all s ∈ [s0,m/N ],
then α(y)(·) = α(y′)(·) on [s0, (m+ 1)/N ]
We denote by ANADC(s0) the set of such strategies of the player 1 and, similarly, those
of player 2 by BNADC(s0).
Since every strategy α ∈ ANADC(s0) and β ∈ BNADC(s0) are non-anticipative with
delay, there exists a unique pair of control x ∈ X (s0) and y ∈ Y(s0) such that α(y) = x
and β(x) = y. We can define as usual the game in normal form and the values.
Definition 7 The upper-value of the game is defined for every s0 ∈ (0, 1] and g0 ∈ G by
V +NADC(s0, g0) = inf
α∈ANADC (s0)
sup
β∈BNADC(s0)
ℓ(gs0,g0,α,β(1)) = inf
α∈ANADC(s0)
sup
y
ℓ(gs0,g0,α(y),y(1)).
Similarly, the lower-value is defined for every s0 ∈ (0, 1] and g0 ∈ G by
V −NADC(s0, g0) = sup
β∈BNADC(s0)
inf
α∈ANADC (s0)
ℓ(gs0,g0,α,β(1)) = sup
β∈BNADC(s0)
inf
x
ℓ(gs0,g0,x,β(x)(1)).
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It always holds that V −NADC ≤ V +NADC and, because of the dynamics we consider,
these mappings are regular:
Lemma 8 Let κ > 0 be a uniform bound on g0 and ‖xAy‖, then
1) V +NADC(·, g0) and V −NADC(·, g0) are 2κ-Lipschitz and can be extended to [0, 1].
2) V +NADC(0, g0) and V
−
NADC(0, g0) are independent of g0
3) V +NADC(s, ·) and V −NADC(s, ·) are 2κs-Lipschitz
Proof. Since for every control x ∈ X (s0) and y ∈ Y(s0), and any s1 ≥ s0, it holds
gs0,g0,x,y(1) − gs1,g0,x,y(1) = s0g0 +
∫ 1
s0
x(t)Ay(t)dt − s1g0 −
∫ 1
s1
x(t)Ay(t)
= (s0 − s1)g0 +
∫ s1
s0
x(t)Ay(t)dt ,
one immediately obtains that V +NADC(·, g0), V −NADC(·, g0) are 2κ-Lipschitz, where κ is a
uniform bound on ‖g0‖ and ‖xAy‖. As a consequence, they can be uniquely extended
to a 2κ-Lipschitz mapping on [0, 1].
Since ℓ is 1-Lipschitz and
‖gs0,g0,x,y(1) − gs0,g′0,x,y(1)‖ = s0‖g0 − g′0‖ ≤ 2κs0,
we obtain that both V +NADC(s0, ·) and V −NADC(s0, ·) are 2κs0-Lipschitz. As a conse-
quence, the limit when s0 goes to zero of V
+
NADC(s0, g0) is independent of g0. ✷
It is worth pointing out that due to the specific form of the dynamics (2) we are
considering, the above lemma 8 is only valid for s0 > 0.
It remains to show that a value exists, i.e., that V +NADC(s0, g0) = V
−
NADC(s0, g0).
This is due to results valid on a more general context than the dynamics (2). We only
sketch the proof, details can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 9 The game has a value in NADC strategies which coincides with the value
of the game in NAD strategies, i.e., for every s0 > 0 and g0 ∈ Rd,
V −(s0, g0) = V
−
NADC(s0, g0) = V
+
NADC(s0, g0) = V
+(s0, g0) = V (s0, g0).
Proof. Because of Sion [39] minmax theorem, H+ = H−. Since both equations (10)
and (11) - stated in the appendix - reduce to the equation (4), Isaacs condition (12)
holds true. The result is a direct consequence of Theorem 20 of the appendix. ✷
From now on we will shortly denote by V the value of the game and since V (0, ·) is
constant, we simply denote it by V (0).
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2.3 From strategies in differential game to strategies in repeated game
We introduced the new concept of strategies as they are more adapted to the discretiza-
tion of differential games into repeated games. We now explain this claim through the
following lemma.
Lemma 10 A strategy α ∈ ANADC(s0), whose delay is 1/N (see Definition 6), naturally
induces, in the n-stage repeated game with n ≥ N , a strategy σα,n satisfying∥∥∥gn − gs0,g∗0 ,α(y),y(1)∥∥∥ ≤ 2Nκn ,
where y is the continuous piece-wise constant version of the strategy of player 2 in the n
stage repeated game, and g∗0 is some specific point in G.
Proof. Let 1/N be the delay of α given by Definition 6 and m∗ ∈ N∗ be such that
m∗ − 1 < s0N ≤ m∗. We denote by x0 the value of α(y′)(s0) which is independent of
the control of player 2, because α is non-anticipative with delay. We also assume that
n ≥ N and we let k ≥ 1 be such that n ≥ kN + r with r < N .
We construct the strategy σα,n as follows:
1. During the first km∗ stages, play some arbitrary action x0.
2. The strategy of player 2 in discrete time generates a sequence y1, y2, . . . , ykN ∈ Y .
Define a control y in continuous time by y(m−1kN + s) = ym for any s ∈ [0, 1kN )
3. At stage m ∈ {km∗ + 1, . . . , kN}, σα,n dictates to play α(y)[m−1kN ]
4. During the last r stages, play again arbitrarily.
If n < N , then σα,n is defined arbitrarily.
By construction of σα,n it immediately reads that gkN = g
s0,g∗0 ,α(y),y(1) where y is
the control defined above and g∗0 = g
1/kN,x0Ay1,x0,y(s0). As a consequence,∥∥∥gn − gs0,g∗0 ,α(y),y(1)∥∥∥ ≤ 2rκn ≤ 2κm∗ ,
hence the result. ✷
We can finally state and recover the main result of Vieille.
Theorem 11 A closed set E is either weakly approachable or weakly excludable. More
precisely, it is weakly approachable by player 1 if V (0) = 0 and weakly excludable by
player 2 if V (0) > 0.
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Proof. Assume that V (0) = 0, let ε > 0 be fixed and s0 = ε/2κ. Lemma 8 implies
that V (s0, g0) ≤ ε for any g0 ∈ G. Let α ∈ ANADC be any ε-optimal strategy in this
game and σα,n the associated strategy provided by Lemma 10, then
ℓ
(
gs0,g
∗
0 ,α(y),y(1)
)
≤ ℓ
(
gs0,g0,α(y),y(1)
)
+ s0‖g0 − g∗0‖ ≤ (V (δ, g0) + ε) + ε ≤ 3ε .
Assuming that n = kN + r with 2κ/k ≤ ε, we finally obtain that the distance from gn
to E is smaller than 4ε. Thus, E is weakly approachable.
If V (0) = η > 0, then the same proof gives the fact that the complement of the
η-neighborhood of E is weakly excludable by player 2, so E is weakly excludable. ✷
3 Weak approachability with partial monitoring through a
differential game on Wasserstein space
As mentioned in the introduction, we aimed at generalizing the precedent results obtained
in a standard Euclidean space to the space of probabilities measures, embedded with the
Wasserstein distance. First, we provide some reminder and notations on the Wasserstein
distance (and space) and then we describe the associated differential game.
3.1 Preliminaries on Wasserstein distance
We define in this section the distance Wasserstein distance W2 already mentioned in
the introduction. We also introduce some material that will be used in the sequel. The
reader can refer for this part to the books [3, 16, 38, 43]. For this section only, let us
denote by K a compact set of some Euclidean space, whose Euclidean norm is denoted
by ‖ · ‖.
For every µ and ν in ∆(K), the set of probability measures on K, the (squared)
Wasserstein distance between µ and ν is defined by:
W 22 (µ, ν) := inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
K2
‖x− y‖2dγ(x, y) (5)
where Π(µ, ν) is the set of probability measures γ ∈ ∆(K ×K) with first marginal µ
and second marginal ν. As a consequence of Kantorovitch duality (see for instance [16],
chapter 11.8 or [43], chapter 2), an equivalent definition of W2 is
W 22 (µ, ν) = sup
φ∈Ξ
J(φ) :=
∫
K
φdµ+
∫
K
φ∗dν, (6)
where Ξ is the set of continuous functions φ ∈ L1µ(K,R) such that φ(x) + φ∗(y) ≤
‖x− y‖2, µ⊗ ν-as with, for some arbitrarily chosen and fixed x∗ ∈ K,
φ∗(x) = inf
y∈K
‖x− y‖2 − φ(y), φ = (φ∗)∗ and φ(x∗) = 0.
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The supports of µ and ν are compact, so any function φ in Ξ is 2‖K‖-Lipschitz,
where ‖K‖ is the diameter of K. Thus Arzela-Ascoli’s theorem implies that (Ξ, ‖‖∞) is
relatively compact. Consequently the supremum in formula (6) is achieved; we denote
by Φ(µ, ν) the subset of Ξ that maximizes J(φ, φ∗). Its elements are called Kantorovitch
potentials from µ to ν.
3.2 A differential game in Wasserstein space
In the Wasserstein space of probability measures, the associated differential game we
consider is described as follows. For technical reasons - the unicity of Kantorovich po-
tentials -, the action sets of the players are not going to be ∆(X) and ∆(Z), but subsets
of measures with a positive density lower bounded away from zero.
More precisely, let δ > 0 be some fixed parameter. Then there exist [16] some sets
∆δ(X) ⊂ ∆(X) and ∆δ(Z) ⊂ ∆(Z) such that
i) ∆δ(X) is a convex and compact set;
ii) For every µ ∈ ∆(X), there exists µδ ∈ ∆δ(X) such that W2(µ, µδ) ≤ δ;
iii) There exists δ > 0 such that every µδ ∈ ∆δ(X) has a positive density lower-
bounded by δ.
iv) With a slight abuse of notations, ∆δ(X ×Z) is the closed convex hull of the set of
product measures µ⊗ ν where µ ∈ ∆δ(X) and ν ∈ ∆δ(Z).
We consider the differential game defined on [s0, 1] with s0 ∈ (0, 1) where
Controls of players are measurable maps x and z from [s0, 1] to ∆δ(X) or ∆δ(Z);
they are elements of Xδ(s0) and Zδ(s0)
NADC strategies are mappings from Zδ(s0) into Xδ(s0) (for the player 1) satisfying
the property given in Definition 6 in Section 2.2. They are elements of ANADC,δ(s0)
and similarly of BNADC,δ(s0) for player 2.
Because they are non-anticipative, the game can be written in normal form.
The dynamics are given by the integral formula:
θ(s) =
s0
s
θ0 +
1
s
∫ s
s0
x(t)⊗ z(t)dt, θ(s0) = θ0 ∈ ∆δ(X × Z)
The terminal loss is W 22
(
θs0,g0,α,β(1), E˜
)
where W 22 (·, E˜) is the square Wasserstein
distance to a closed set E˜.
The upper and lower values are the mapping defined by, for the upper value,
V +(s0, θ0) = inf
α
sup
β
W 22 (θ
s0,θ0,α,β(1), E˜) = inf
α
sup
z
W 22 (θ
s0,θ0,α(z),z(1), E˜).
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and, for the lower value, by
V −(s0, θ0) = sup
β
inf
α
W 22 (θ
s0,θ0,α,β(1), E˜) = sup
β
inf
x
W 22 (θ
s0,θ0,x,β(x)(1), E˜).
Name of the game. We shall denote this game as ΓE˜,δ(s0, θ0).
3.3 Sub and super-solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in
Wasserstein space. Comparison principle
In this section we define sub and super solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
(HJB equation for short) in Wasserstein space and we obtain a comparison principle for
this HJB equation. Let us first define an adapted concept of sub- and super-differential.
Definition 12 Let ω : [s0, 1] ×∆δ(X × Z) → R be a function and let (t¯, µ¯) ∈ (s0, 1) ×
∆δ(X × Z). We say that the pair (pt¯, φµ¯) ∈ R × Ξ belongs to the super-differential
D+
(
ω(t¯, µ¯)
)
to ω at (t¯, µ¯) if
lim sup
α→0,t→t¯
sup
µ∈∆δ(X×Z)
ω(t, (1− α)µ¯ + αµ)− ω(t¯, µ¯)− pt¯(t− t¯)− α
∫
φµ¯d (µ− µ¯)
α+ |t− t¯| ≤ 0.
A pair (pt¯, φµ¯) ∈ R × Ξ belongs to the sub-differential D−
(
ω(t¯, µ¯)
)
to ω at (t¯, µ¯) if
(−pt¯,−φµ¯) ∈ R× Ξ belongs to the super-differential D+
(− ω(t¯, µ¯)) to −ω at (t¯, µ¯).
The supremum over µ ∈ ∆δ(X × Z) in this definition is the counterpart of the
classical uniform convergence with respect to all possible directions in Euclidean spaces.
Given an Hamiltonian H : [s0, 1]×∆δ(X ×Z)×Ξ→ R, we consider the associated HJB
equation:
ωt +H(t, µ,Dω) = 0 (7)
Its solutions are defined as follows.
Definition 13 A sub-solution of the HJB Equation (7) is an upper-semicontinuous map
ω : [s0, 1] × ∆δ(X × Z) → R such that for any (t, µ) ∈ (s0, 1) × ∆δ(X × Z) and any
(pt, φµ) ∈ D+
(
ω(t, µ)
)
we have
pt +H(t, µ, φµ) ≥ 0.
Super-solution are defined similarly.
We impose some regularity assumptions on H so that a comparison principle can be
derived.
Assumption 1 Assumptions on the regularity of H:
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i) For any µ, ν ∈ ∆δ(X × Z), if φ is the Kantorovitch potential from µ to ν then
tH(t, ν,−φ⋆)− sH(s, µ, φ) ≥W 22 (µ, ν)
ii) H is positively homogenous in φ.
Using this assumption, we can derive the following comparison principle.
Theorem 14 Comparison principle
If ω1 and ω2 are respectively Lipschitz sub- and super-solution of Equation (7) and
Assumption 1 is satisfied then
inf
[s0,1]×∆δ(X×Z)
(ω2 − ω1) = inf
∆δ(X×Z)
ω2(1, ·) − ω1(1, ·) =: A
Proof. Let k > 0 be a Lipschitz constant of ω1 and ω2. Assume A = 0 and let
(t0, µ0) such that
−ξ := inf
[s0,1]×∆δ(X×Z)
(ω2 − ω1) < 0 and (ω2 − ω1)(t0, µ0) < −ξ/2
and choose η > 0 and γ > 0 such that
ξ > 2(η + k2γ) and η >
2k2γ
s0
.
Let Φ on
(
[s0, 1]×∆δ(X × Z)
)2
be defined by
Φ(s, µ, t, ν) = −ω1(s, µ) + ω2(t, ν) + 1
γ
(
W 22 (µ, ν) + (t− s)2
)
− ηs
and let (s¯, µ¯, t¯, ν¯) be any of its minimizers. The fact that Φ(s¯, µ¯, t¯, ν¯) ≤ Φ(s¯, µ¯, s¯, µ¯)
implies that
1
γ
(
W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) + |s¯− t¯|2
)
≤ ω2(s¯, µ¯)− ω2(t¯, ν¯) ≤ k
√
W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) + |s¯− t¯|2.
where the last inequality follows from the fact that ω2 is k-Lipschitz. As a consequence,
we immediately obtain that
W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) + |s¯− t¯|2 ≤ k2γ2
Assume that s¯, t¯ ∈ (s0, 1) and let φ be the Kantorovitch potential from µ¯ to ν¯.
Let µ ∈ ∆δ(X × Z) be some fixed measure and, for every α ∈ (0, 1], let φα ∈ Ξ be
the Kantorovitch potential from (1 − α)µ¯ + αµ to ν¯. We recall that the mapping that
associates to a pair (µ, ν) ∈ ∆δ(X×Z)2 the set of Kantorovitch potentials is single-valued
because µ and ν have a density bounded away from zero. This mapping is also uniformly
continuous as ∆δ(X × Z) is compact. We denote by Ω(·) its modulus of continuity.
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Since Φ(s¯, µ¯, t¯, ν¯) ≤ Φ(s, (1− α)µ¯ + αµ, t¯, ν¯), we obtain that
ω1(s, (1−α)µ¯+αµ) ≤ ω1(s¯, µ¯)+1
γ
(
W 22
(
(1−α)µ¯+αµ, ν¯)−W 22 (µ¯, ν¯)+(s−t¯)2−(s¯−t¯)2)+η(s¯−s)
In particular, using the definition of W2 in terms of Kantorovich potentials,
W 22
(
(1− α)µ¯+ αµ, ν¯)−W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) ≤ ∫ φαd{(1− α)µ¯ + αµ}+ ∫ φ⋆αd ν¯ − ∫ φαd µ¯− ∫ φ⋆αd ν¯
= α
∫
φαd (µ− µ¯)
= α
∫
φd (µ − µ¯) + α ∫ (φα − φ)d (µ − µ¯)
≤ α ∫ φd (µ− µ¯) + αK1‖φα − φ‖∞
≤ α ∫ φd (µ− µ¯) + αK1Ω(K2√α)
where K1,K2 > 0 are constants depending on X and Z.
Using the simple fact that
(s− t¯)2 − (s¯− t¯)2 = (s− s¯)(s + s¯− 2t¯) = 2(s − s¯)(s¯ − t¯) + (s− s¯)2
we therefore obtain that (
2
γ
(s¯− t¯)− η, 1
γ
φ
)
∈ D+ω1(s¯, µ¯).
A similar proof give the dual result, i.e.,
(
2
γ (s¯ − t¯),− 1γφ⋆
)
∈ D−ω2(t¯, ν¯).
Since ω1 and ω2 are respectively sub and super-solution, we therefore deduce that
2
γ
(s¯− t¯)− η +H
(
s¯, µ¯,
1
γ
φ
)
≥ 0 and 2
γ
(s¯− t¯) +H
(
t¯, ν¯,−1
γ
φ⋆
)
≤ 0.
The homogeneity and the regularity of H yield that
W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) ≤ t¯H(t¯, ν¯,−φ⋆)− s¯H(s¯, µ¯, φ) ≤ 2(s¯ − t¯)2 − ηs¯γ
thus, dividing by γs¯,
η ≤ 1
s¯γ
(−W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) + 2(s¯− t¯)2) ≤ 2k2
γ
s0
which is in contradiction with the choice of η.
It remains to check that s¯ and t¯ cannot be equal to s0 or 1 and this can be done
exactly as in [11]. For the sake of completeness, we provide the proof nonetheless.
Assume that s¯ = 1 (the case t¯ = 1 is identical). By definition of µ¯, s¯, ν¯, t¯ and µ0, t0
Φ(s¯, µ¯, t¯, ν¯) ≤ Φ(t0, µ0, t0, µ0) = ω2(t0, µ0)− ω1(t0, µ0)− ηt0 ≤ −ξ/2.
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Since s¯ = 1 and ω2 is k-Lipschitz, we deduce that
ω2(1, ν¯)− k
√
W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) + |s¯− t¯|2 − ω1(1, µ¯) +
1
γ
(
W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) + |s¯− t¯|2
)
− η ≤ −ξ/2
The assumption that A = inf ω2(1, ·) − ω1(1, ·) = 0 yields that
−k
√
W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) + |s¯− t¯|2 +
1
γ
(
W 22 (µ¯, ν¯) + |s¯− t¯|2
)
− η ≤ −ξ/2
which is impossible given the choice of ξ. If s¯ = s0, then we conclude using the fact that
a sub- or super-solution on (s0, 1] is a sub- or super-solution on [s0, 1]. ✷
The proof of Theorem 14 indicates that condition i) of Assumption 1 could actually
be replaced by the following weaker version. There exists some k′ > 0 such that
tH(t, ν,−φ⋆)− sH(s, µ, φ) ≥ −k′W 22 (µ, ν), ∀µ, ν ∈ ∆δ(X × Z).
3.4 Existence of a value in the differential game
As in Euclidean space, we can derive some regularity of the upper and the lower value
functions.
Proposition 15 Both the upper and the lower value functions V +(·, ·) and V −(·, ·) are
Lipschitz on (s0, 1]×∆δ(X×Z), for every s0 > 0, with a Lipschitz-constant independent
of δ and s0. They can be uniquely extended to [0, 1] to mappings such that V
±(0, ·) are
constant.
Moreover, the upper value function V + is a sub-solution to (7) with
H = H+(t, µ, φ) := inf
x
sup
z
1
t
∫
φd (x⊗ z− µ).
The lower value function V − is a super-solution to (7) with
H = H−(t, µ, φ) := sup
z
inf
x
1
t
∫
φd (x⊗ z− µ).
Proof. Using the exact same proofs than in Appendix 4, we can show that V + and
V − are Lipschitz and they satisfy the dynamic programming principle. It only remains
to show that it implies that they are sub- and super-solution of (7), which was a well
known fact in Euclidean space (see Lemma 21 and Theorem 20).
The dynamic programming principle and the integral form of θ(s) imply that for
0 < t0 < t0 + h < 1
V +(t0, θ0) = inf
α
sup
z
V + (t0 + h, (1 − εt0,h)θ0 + εt0,hλα,z,t0,h) (8)
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where λα,z,t0,h :=
1
h
∫ t0+h
t0
α(z)(s) ⊗ z(s)d s and εt0,h :=
h
t0 + h
.
Take α a NADC strategy. For h small enough, the strategy α is constant on (t0, t0+h).
So there exists some xα ∈ ∆δ(X) such for any z(·) we have α(z)(s) = xα for any
s ∈ (t0, t0 + h).
Let (pt, φµ) ∈ D+V +(t0, µ0), then the definition of sub differential implies that for
any z(·)
V +(t0 + h, (1 − εt0,h)θ0 + εt0,hλα,z,t0,h)− V +(t0, θ0)
h
≤ pt + 1
h
εt0,h
∫
φµd (λα,z,t0,h − θ0) +
1
h
(h+ εt0,h)o(h + εt0,h)
where o(h + εt0,h) → 0 as h → 0+ uniformly with respect to z(·) and α. Since α is
constant on (t0, t0 + h), we get
V +(t0 + h, (1 − εt0,h)θ0 + εt0,hλα,z,t0,h)− V +(t0, θ0)
h
≤ pt + εt0,h
∫
X×Z
φµd (
1
h
∫ t0+h
t0
xα ⊗ z(s)d s− θ0) + 1
h
(h+ εt0,h)o(h+ εt0,h)
≤ pt + εt0,h sup
z∈∆δ(Z)
∫
X×Z
φµd (xα ⊗ z− θ0) + 1
h
(h+ εt0,h)o(h+ εt0,h)
Observe that any constant control x can generate a NADC strategy α such that α is
constant equal to x on (t0, t0 + h). So passing to the supremum over z(·) and to the
infimum over α, we obtain in view of (8)
0 ≤ pt + εt0,hn inf
x∈∆δ(Z)
sup
z∈∆δ(Z)
∫
X×Z
φµd (x⊗ z− θ0) + hn + εt0,hn
hn
o(hn + εt0,hn).
Letting h→ 0, this gives
0 ≤ pt + inf
x∈∆δ(X)
sup
z∈∆δ(Z)
1
t0
∫
φµd (x⊗ z− θ0)
thus V + is a sub-solution of (7) with respect to the Hamiltonian defined byH+(t, µ, φ) :=
infx supz
1
t
∫
φd (x⊗ z− µ).
The proof that V − is a super-solution is similar and is omitted. ✷
Before being able to state the existence of the value by using the comparison principle
stated in Theorem 14, we need to prove that H+ and H− satisfy Assumption 1.
Proposition 16 H+ = H− and they satisfy Assumption 1.
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Proof. Assume that φ is the Kantorovitch potential from µ to ν, then
tH+(t, µ, φ) = inf
x
sup
z
∫
φd (x⊗ z− µ)
= −
∫
φdµ−
∫
φ⋆d ν + inf
x
sup
z
∫
φ⋆d ν +
∫
φd bx⊗ z
≤ −d(µ, ν)2 + inf
x
sup
z
∫
(−φ∗)d (x⊗ z− ν)
= −d(µ, ν)2 + sH+(s, µ,−φ⋆),
where the inequality is a consequence of the fact that φ ≤ −φ∗. So H+ satisfies Assump-
tion 1.
Since any mapping φ ∈ Ξ is continuous and X,Z are compact sets in Euclidean
space, Sion [39] minmax theorem implies that H+ = H−. ✷
Corollary 17 The game ΓE˜,δ(s0, θ0) has a value V . Moreover, V (0, ·) is constant.
Proof. The existence is a direct consequence of the comparison principle stated in
Theorem 14 and the fact that V is constant is due to the regularity property of V ±
stated in Proposition 15. ✷
We denote by V
E˜,δ
the value of the constant mapping V (0, ·).
3.5 From differential game to repeated game and weak approachability
As in the Euclidian case, we can now formulate the general approachability theorem:
Theorem 18 Any closed set E˜ ⊂ ∆(X × Z) is either weakly-approachable or weakly-
excludable.
More precisely, E˜ is weakly approachable if and only if supε lim infδ VE˜ε,δ = 0.
Proof. Assume first that supε lim infδ VE˜ε,δ = 0 and let ε be fixed and such that
lim infδ VE˜ε,δ = 0.
For any ε′ > 0, let δ > 0 be such that VEε,δ < ε
′, s0 ≤ ε′/L where L is the Lipschitz
constant of V and θ0 ∈ ∆δ(X × Z) chosen arbitrarily.
Given any ε′-optimal strategy α ∈ ANADC(s0, θ0) in the game ΓE˜ε,δ(s0, θ0), we are
going to construct a strategy σα,n of player 1 in the repeated game. This is done almost
exactly as in Section 2.3. The only difficulty is that player 2 can choose at stage n ∈ N
some action zn ∈ ∆(Z) that does not belong to ∆δ(Z). In that case, we approximate
zn by z
δ
n ∈ ∆δ(Z) such that W2(zδn, zn) ≤ δ ≤ ε and the strategy σα,n is defined with
respect to α and the sequence {zδn}.
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Denoting θδn = xn ⊗ zδn, the strategy σα,n we have constructed is such that for any
n ∈ N large enough (see the proof of Theorem 11),
W 22 (θ
δ
n, E˜) ≤ VE˜ε,δ + 4ε′ ≤ 5ε′.
This entails the weak-approachability of E˜ since (for n large enough)
W2(θn, E˜) ≤W2(θn, E˜ε) + ε ≤W2(θδn, E˜ε) + ε+ δ ≤
√
5ε′ + ε+ δ.
Letting ε′ and δ to zero entails the result.
Reciprocally, assume that supε lim infδ VEε,δ = η > 0. Thus for some ε > 0 and every
δ small enough, VEε,δ ≥ η/2. This implies that player 2 can weakly approach E˜ε (as
before, if player 1 chooses xn 6∈ ∆δ(X), player 2 can respond as if he played xδn ∈ ∆δ(X)).
Therefore any closed set is either weakly-approachable of weakly-excludable. ✷
This result has an important corollary in repeated game with partial monitoring:
Corollary 19 Any closed set E ⊂ Rd such that there exists a some closed set E˜ ⊂
∆(X × Z) satisfying
E = {Eq[p], q ∈ E˜} ⊂ Rd
is either weakly-approachable or weakly-excludable. If there exists no such set E˜, then it is
possible that E is neither weakly-approachable nor weakly-excludable (and, furthermore,
E can even be a convex and compact subset of Rd).
4 Appendix
In this section, we recall some well known facts on differential games. We also prove
that the values of a rather general differential game with nonanticipative strategies with
delay coincide with the values defined with NADC strategies. This is a new result with
is valuable by itself independently on the problem of weak approachability.
Let us consider the dynamics
g′(s) = f(s, g(s), x(s), y(s)), s ∈ [a, 1] (9)
where a < 1 is fixed and f : [a, 1]×Rd×X×Y 7→ Rd is a Lipschitz continuous bounded
map. Let ℓ : Rd 7→ R be a Lipschitz continuous function. For any s ∈ [a, 1] g0 ∈ Rd
and (x,y) ∈ X (s0) × Y(s0) we denote by s 7→ gs0,g0,x,y(s) the unique solution to (9).
Similarly for any pair (α, β) ∈ A(s0)×B(s0) we set gs0,g0,α,β = gs0,g0,α,β where (x,y) is
associated with (α, β) by Lemma 5.
For every s0 ∈ (0, 1] and g0 ∈ Rd, one can define the upper-value of the game
V +(s0, g0) := inf
α∈A(s0)
sup
β∈B(s0)
ℓ(gs0,g0,α,β(1)).
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and the lower-value
V −(s0, g0) = sup
β∈B(s0)
inf
α∈A(s0)
ℓ(gs0,g0,α,β(1)).
Lemma 5 implies the following:
V +(s0, g0) = inf
α∈A(s0)
sup
y
ℓ(gs0,g0,α(y),y(1)), V −(s0, g0) = sup
β∈B(s0)
inf
x
ℓ(gs0,g0,x,β(x)(1)).
Due to the Lipschitz continuity of the cost function ℓ and the regularity of the dynam-
ics (9), one can easily obtain from the above relation that V + and V − coincide with the
values defined in subsection 1.2.
Under the above assumption it is well known that V + and V − are Lipschitz contin-
uous and they are respectively viscosity solutions of Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs Equations
(cf for instance [17, 5] see also [9] and the references therein): V + solves{
∂V
∂s (s, g) +H
+
(
s, g, ∂V∂g (s, g)
)
= 0 forall (s, g) ∈ [a, 1] × Rd
V (1, g) = ℓ(g) forall g ∈ Rd
(10)
while V − is a solution to{
∂V
∂s (s, g) +H
−
(
s, g, ∂V∂g (s, g)
)
= 0 forall (s, g) ∈ [a, 1] × Rd
V (1, g) = ℓ(g) forall g ∈ Rd
(11)
where the Hamiltonians are defined respectively by
H−(s, g, p) := sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
p.f(s, g, x, y) and H+(s, g, p) := inf
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
p.f(s, g, x, y).
Moreover the PDE (10) has a unique bounded uniformly continuous viscosity solution
[14, 5], the same property holds for (11).
If furthermore we assume the following Isaacs equation
H−(s, g, p) = H+(s, g, p), ∀(s, g, p), (12)
then the Hamilton Jacobi Equations (10) and (11) are the same and consequently V + =
V − (the differential game has a value).
One can also define the values using strategies NADC of Definition 6 as follows
V +NADC(s0, g0) := inf
α∈ANADC(s0)
sup
β∈BNADC(s0)
ℓ(gs0,g0,α,β(1)).
V −NADC(s0, g0) := sup
β∈BNADC(s0)
inf
α∈ANADC(s0)
ℓ(gs0,g0,α,β(1)).
Once again observe that Lemma 5 yields
V +NADC(s0, g0) = inf
α∈ANADC (s0)
sup
y
ℓ(gs0,g0,α(y),y(1)),
V −NADC(s0, g0) = sup
β∈BNADC(s0)
inf
x
ℓ(gs0,g0,x,β(x)(1)).
We now prove that under our assumptions the NADC strategies define the same
values that values defined through NAD strategies.
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Theorem 20
V +NADC = V
+and V −NADC = V
−.
V +NADC = V
+ is the unique bounded uniformly continuous viscosity solution to (10) while
V −NADC = V
− is the unique bounded uniformly continuous viscosity solution to (11)
Proof. We first show that the values V ±NADC satisfy the following dynamic programming
principle (which proof is postponed later on).
Lemma 21 for all 0 < s0 < s1 ≤ 1 ,{
i) V −NADC(s0, g0) = supβ∈BNADC(s0) infx V
−
NADC(s1, g
s0,g0,x,β(x)(s1))
ii) V +NADC(s0, g0) = infα∈ANADC (s0) supy V
+
NADC(s1, g
s0,g0,α(y),y)(s1))
.
Once the dynamic programming is obtained, it is standard [5] to prove that V +NADC and
V −NADC are viscosity solution of (10) and (11) respectively.
As for V + and V −, the same arguments allow to obtain that V +NADC and V
−
NADC are
Lipschitz continuous.
V +NADC and V
+ are both viscosity solutions to (10) which has a unique bounded
uniformly continuous viscosity solution by the comparison theorem of [14]). So we deduce
that V +NADC = V
+. Similarly we obtain V −NADC = V
−, which completes the proof of
Theorem 20. ✷
It only remains to prove Lemma 21.
Proof of Lemma 21 We only prove the part i) of the Lemma since part ii) is very
similar.
Denote by W (s0, s1, g0) := supβ infx V
−(s1, g
s0,g0,x,β(x)(s1))
The proof goes in two steps, we first prove that V −NADC(s0, g0) ≤ W (s0, s1, g0) and
then that the converse inequality also holds.
i) Let β0 ∈ BNADC(s0), x0 ∈ X (s0) and define g(s) = gs0,g0,x0,β0(x0)(s). We construct
a strategy β1 by
∀x ∈ X (s1), β1(x) = β0(x˜) where x˜ =
{
x0 on [s0, s1]
x on [s1, 1]
By construction, β1 belongs to BNADC because β0 does; gs0,g0,x˜,β0(x˜) coincides with
gs1,g(s1),x,β1(x) on [s1, 1] thus ℓ
(
gs1,g(s1),x,β1(x)(1)
)
= ℓ
(
gs0,g0,x˜,β0(x˜)(1)
)
and
inf
x∈X (s1)
ℓ
(
gs1,g(s1),x,β1(x)(1)
)
= inf
x∈X (s0), x=x0 on [s0,s1]
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,x,β0(x)(1)
)
≥ inf
x∈X (s0)
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,x,β0(x)(1)
)
.
The term on the left is smaller than V −(s1, g(s1)) = V
−(s1, g
s0,g0,x0,β0(x0)(s1));
since x0 and β0 where taken arbitrarily, we deduce that
sup
β0∈BNADC
inf
x0
V −(s1, g
s0,g0,x0,β0(x0)(s1)) ≥ sup
β0∈BNADC
inf
x
ℓ
(
gs0,g0,x,β0(x)(1)
)
which is the first inequality claimed.
21
ii) We now prove the converse inequality. Let g0 and ε > 0 be fixed, s
+
1 be any rational
number in [s1, s1 + ε). Consider
R(g0) := {gs0,g0,x,y(s), (x,y) ∈ X (s0)× Y(s0), s ∈ [s0, 1] }
the attainable set starting from (s0, g0) which is a precompact subset of R
d. Given
g1 ∈ R(g0), let us define βg1 ∈ BNADC(s+1 ) such that
inf
x∈X (s+1 )
ℓ
(
gs
+
1 ,g1,x,βg1(x)(1)
)
> V −NADC(s
+
1 , g1)− ε.
Since V −NADC is Lipschitz and R(g0) is compact, we can assume that there exists
only a finite number of different strategies βg.
Given β0 ∈ BNADC(s0), we construct a new strategy β ∈ BNADC(s0) by
∀x ∈ X (s0), β(x) =
{
β0(x) on [s0, s
+
1 ]
βg(s+1 )
(x|
[s+
1
,1]
) on [s+1 , 1]
,
with g(s+1 ) = g
s0,g0,x,β(x)(s+1 ) = g
s0,g0,x,β0(x)(s+1 ). The fact that β belongs to
BNADC(s0) comes from the fact that there exists only a finite number of βg and
s+1 is rational (this ensures the existence of the integer N required by point 1)).
Therefore, we obtain for any x ∈ X (s0),
ℓ
(
s0, g0,x, β(x)
)
= ℓ
(
s+1 , g(s
+
1 ),x|
[s
+
1 ,1]
, βg(s+1 )
(x|
[s
+
1 ,1]
)
)
≥ V −NADC(s+1 , g(s+1 ))− ε.
Taking the infimum in x ∈ X (s0) and the supremum in β0 ∈ BNADC(s0) yield
V −NADC(s0, g0) ≥ sup
β0
inf
x∈X (s0)
V −NADC(s
+
1 , g(s
+
1 ))− ε.
Because ‖g(s1+)−g(s1)‖ ≤ ‖f‖∞|s+1 −s1| ≤ ‖f‖∞ε and since V −NADC is Lipschitz,
we obtain that
V −NADC(s0, g0) ≥W (s0, s1, g0)− (1 + ‖f‖∞)Lip(V −NADC)ε− ε .
This completes the proof of Lemma 21. ✷
Remark The same idea of proof shows that Theorem 20 also holds true for values
defined through the strategies defined below. A fixed delay nonanticipative strategy for
player I is a map α : Y(s0) 7→ X (s0) such that there exists τ > 0 such that for any
t ∈ [s0, 1] if y1(·)) and y2(·) coincide almost surely on [s0, t] then the controls α(y1)(·))
and α(y2)(·) coincide almost surely on [s0,min{t+ τ, 1}]. We define in a similar way the
set B(s0) of nonanticipative strategies with fixed delay β for the other player.
MPS14
22
References
[1] J. Abernethy, P.L. and Bartlett and E. Hazan, Blackwell approachability and low-
regret learning are equivalent, J. Mach. Learn. Res.: Workshop Conf. Proc., 19,
27–46, 2011.
[2] S. As Soulaimani, M. Quincampoix and S. Sorin, Repeated games and qualitative
differential games: approachability and comparison of strategies, SIAM J. Control
Optim. 48 (2009), 2461–2479
[3] L. Ambrosio, N. Gigli and G. Savaré, Gradient Flows in Metric Spaces and in the
Space of Probability Measures, Lectures in Mathematics, Birkhäuser, (2005).
[4] R.J. Aumann and M. B. Maschler, Repeated games with incomplete information,
MIT Press, 1955.
[5] M. Bardi & I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta. Optimal control and viscosity solutions of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. Birkhäuser (1996).
[6] P. Bettiol, P. Cardaliaguet, M. Quincampoix, Marc Zero-sum state constrained
differential games: existence of value for Bolza problem. Internat. J. Game Theory
34 (2006), no. 4, 495-527.
[7] D. Blackwell, An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs. Pacific J. Math.,
6 (1956), 1–8.
[8] D. Blackwell, Controlled random walks, in: Proceedings of the International
Congress of Mathematicians, 1954, Amsterdam, vol. III, 1956
[9] R. Buckdahn, P. Cardaliaguet, M. Quincampoix Some recent aspects of differential
game theory (Survey) Dynamic Games and Applications , Volume 1, Number 1,
74-114 (2011)
[10] P. Cardaliaguet, M. Quincampoix, P. Saint-Pierre, Pursuit differential games with
state constraints. SIAM J. Control Optim. 39 (2000), no. 5, 1615-1632.
[11] P. Cardaliaguet and M. Quincampoix, Deterministic differential games under
probability knowledge of initial condition International Game Theory Review. 10
(2008), 1-16.
[12] P. Cardaliaguet, R. Laraki, R., and S. Sorin, A continuous time approach for the
asymptotic value in two-person zero-sum repeated games, SIAM J. on Control and
Optimization, 50 (2012), 1573–1596.
[13] N. Cesa-Bianchi and G. Lugosi, Prediction, Learning, and Games, 2006.
[14] M. G. Crandall, H. Ishii, P. L. Lions, (1984) User’s guide to viscosity solutions of
Hamilton Jacobi Equations , Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 282, 452-502.
23
[15] A. P. Dawid, A. P., Self-calibrating priors do not exist: Comment, J. Amer. Statist.
Assoc. , 80, 340–341, 1985.
[16] R.M. Dudley, Real analysis and probability, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
[17] L. Evans, T. Souganidis, Differential games and representation formulas for solu-
tions of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations Indiana Univ. Math. J., (1984) 33, 773-797.
[18] W. Fleming The convergence problem for differential games. J. Math. Anal. Appl.,
3 (1961), 102–116.
[19] W. Fleming The Convergence Problem for Differential Games 2, in Advances in
Game Theory, Ann. of Math. Studies, 52 (1964), Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton,
NJ, 195-210.
[20] D. P. Foster and R. Vohra, Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium, Games
and Economic Behavior, 21, 40–55, 1997.
[21] R. Isaacs, Differential games. A mathematical theory with applications to warfare
and pursuit, control and optimization. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York-London-
Sydney 1965.
[22] C. Jimenez, M. Quincampoix, Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations for differential
games with asymmetric information on probabilistic initial condition. J. Math.
Anal. Appl. 457 (2018), no. 2, 1422-1451.
[23] E. Kohlberg, Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
Internat. J. Game Theory, 4 (1975), 7–24
[24] J. Kwon and V. Perchet, Online Learning and Blackwell Approachability with Par-
tial Monitoring: Optimal Convergence Rates, PMLR Work. Conf. Proc., 54 (2014),
604–613.
[25] G. Lugosi, S. Mannor and G. Stoltz, Strategies for prediction under imperfect mon-
itoring, Math. Oper. Res., 33 (2008), 513–528.
[26] S. Mannor, V. Perchet and G. Stoltz, Robust approachability and regret minimiza-
tion in games with partial monitoring, JMLR Work. Conf. Proc., 19 (2011), 515–
536.
[27] S. Mannor, V. Perchet and G. Stoltz, Approachability in unknown games: Online
learning meets multi-objective optimization, JMLR Work. Conf. Proc., 35 (2014),
1–17.
[28] A. Marigonda, M. Quincampoix, Marc; Mayer control problem with probabilistic
uncertainty on initial positions. J. Differential Equations 264 (2018), no. 5, 3212-
3252.
24
[29] J.F. Mertens, S. Sorin and S. Zamir, Repeated Games, CORE discussion paper
9420–9422, 1994.
[30] V. Perchet, Approachability of convex sets with partial monitoring, J. Optim. The-
ory. Appl., 149 (2011), 665–677
[31] V. Perchet, Internal Regret with Partial Monitoring: Calibration-Based Optimal
Algorithms, J. Mach. Learn. Res., 12 (2011), 1893–1921.
[32] V. Perchet, Approachability, regret and calibration: Implications and equivalences,
J. Dyn. Games, 2 (2014), 181– 254.
[33] V. Perchet, Exponential weight approachability, applications to calibration and re-
gret minimization, Dynamic Games And Applications, 5, 136–153, 2015.
[34] V. Perchet and M. Quincampoix, On a unified framework for approachability with
full or partial monitoring, Mathematics of Operations Research, 40 (2014), 596–
610.
[35] S. Plaskacz, M. Quincampoix, Value-functions for differential games and control
systems with discontinuous terminal cost. SIAM J. Control Optim. 39 (2000), no.
5, 1485-1498.
[36] L. Pontrjagin, Linear differential games. I, II. Dokl. Akad. Nauk SSSR 174 (1967),
1278-1280; ibid. 175 (1967) 764-766.
[37] A. Rustichini, Minimizing regret: the general case, Games Econom. Behav., 29
(1999), 224–243
[38] F. Santambrogio, Optimal transport for applied mathematicians. Calculus of varia-
tions, PDEs, and modeling. Progress in Nonlinear Differential Equations and their
Applications, 87. Birkhauser/Springer, Cham, 2015.
[39] M. Sion, On general minimax theorems, Pacific J. Math, 8 (1958), 171–176.
[40] X. Spinat, A necessary and sufficient condition for approachability, Math. Oper.
Res., 27 (2002), 31–44.
[41] T. Tomala, Belief-free Communication Equilibria, Math. Oper. Res., 38 (2013),
617–637.
[42] N. Vieille Weak approachability, Math. Op. Res., 17 (1992), 781–791.
[43] C. Villani, Topics in optimal transportation, Graduate studies in Mathematics,
AMS, Vol. 58, 2003.
25
